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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
JOSEPH A. ETTINGER* * *
THE COURT OF APPEALS for the Seventh Circuit this year continued
to lead the way in setting precedent in federal criminal cases. With no
diminution in the number of appeals and despite multiple issues, ,the
court has resolved hundreds of legal questions dealing with individual
factual situations. Faced with such a volume of material the practi-
tioner has the burden of sifting through the cases attempting to cull
out information which is meaningful and could reflect alteration of ex-
isting law and procedure.
For those reasons, this article will deal with the court's pro-
nouncements in two ways. First, consideration will be given to several
major decisions having special significance, either because they are of
first impression nationally or locally, or because of their relevance to
events within -the circuit. Second, treatment will be given to cases fall-
ing into several general categories of law and procedure, focusing on
new or emerging concepts within those areas.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES UNDER THE
ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT
Continued federal prosecution of organized crime this year re-
sulted in the application of a previously unused provision of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970.1 Although the Act was intended to
* Associate Professor of Law, I.I.T./Chicago- Kent College of Law; member of
the Illinois Bar; J.D., Tulane University; U.S. Army J.A.G.C. School, University of
Virginia Law School.
** The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Vincent P. Flood, Jr.,
who as Editor, Chicago-Kent Law Review and research associate, devoted much time
and effort in the preparation of this article.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a prin-
cipal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in; or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce. . ..
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, di-
rectly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is en-
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apply to a variety of criminal conduct,2 it also contains provisions for
civil proceedings to be initiated against suspected criminal elements,
which are to be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3
The Seventh Circuit this year approved the election of such a civil
remedy by the government in a case of national first impression.
In United States v. Cappetto,4 the court of appeals was con-
fronted with the dual questions of 1) the constitutionality of the provi-
sions allowing the election of a civil remedy, and 2) the validity of an
application of those provisions to local gambling activities. In elect-
ing the civil remedy, the government had brought an action in the dis-
trict court seeking injunctive relief, and full discovery under rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5  The district court or-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt ....
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
As used in this chapter-
(1) 'racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year;...
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1974 (1970), Civil Remedies, provides as follows:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to pre-
vent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropri-
ate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself
of an interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restric-
tions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not
limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making
due provision for the right of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings . . . . the court
may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such
other actions including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it
shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola-
tion of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in
any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall
estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal of-
fense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.
Defendants in the instant case allegedly violated § 1955; see infra note 81.
4. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1973).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, provides in part:
(a) Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following meth-
ods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interroga-
tories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or
other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental exami-
nations; and requests for admission. ...
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dered the defendants to submit to a deposition and to produce requested
books and records for inspection by the government.
When the defendants refused 'to comply with the discovery order,
and invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
the court granted the government's petition for a temporary injunction
prohibiting further gambling activity during the pendancy of the liti-
gation, defaulted the defendants for failure to answer or otherwise
properly plead to the complaint, and issued contempt citations against
the defendants for their refusal to attend and testify at the deposition.6
Under the Act, the district court also had the power to order a
defendant to divest himself of ownership in realty if it were deter-
mined that the property was in any way involved in gambling opera-
tions. Further, -the Act provides that a court may require the defend-
ants to report to the Government on a quarterly basis for a period of up
to ten years upon the entry of any decree or judgment. 7 The district
court in Cappetto entered no order as to the government's request for
such divestiture and reporting, however, but reserved ruling pending
the termination of the litigation.
The defendants on appeal contended that local gambling, if it is
indeed an offense under the federal law,8 would entitle them to the
protection of the Constitution and to the application of procedures in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. They further argued that
this action, despite its civil label, was in reality punitive insofar as it
would provide for divestiture and quarterly reporting, and that if the
intent of Congress was to curb criminal activity, the provisions of Sec-
tion 1964 clearly reflect an abuse of the congressional power.
In affirming, the Seventh Circuit held that the Organized Crime
Control Act does have as a purpose the elimination of such illegal en-
terprises. But the fact that Congress provided for an election of reme-
dies to prevent or proscribe such illegal "enterprises"9 is clearly within
the commerce power of article I, section 8 of the Constitution, whether
or not such activity may be made criminal by state or federal law.
Congress has always had the power to vest equitable jurisdiction in
courts to provide civil injunctive relief against any activity which has
even a minimal effect on interstate commerce. Divestiture and re-
6. 502 F.2d at 1355.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
8. 502 F.2d at 1355 (7th Cir. 1974).
9. Id. at 1358.
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porting are only aspects of that equitable power, intended ,to remove
any obstacle from the free flow of commerce, as demonstrated by the
extensive application of such procedures in anti-trust cases. 10 The
concern of Congress for the elimination of such activities can allow for
both civil and criminal remedies; clearly, the defendants in Cappetto
failed to make any showing of prejudice in the Congress' decision to
allow both to the government.
In declaring that the defendants had not been denied their fifth
amendment rights by the district court's contempt order for failure to
submit to deposition, the court said that such rights could have been
invoked at any time during the contemplated deposition if the ques-
tions that were asked did tend to incriminate the witness. However,
civil rule 3711 provides that the defendants could not refuse to even at-
tend or testify at such a deposition. The contempt orders were, there-
fore, properly entered.
OFFICIAL CORRUPTION CASES: THE HOBBS ACT
Enforcement of federal laws in the Seventh Circuit has not been
confined solely to organized crime. Prosecution for violations of the
Hobbs Act' 2 have resulted in the conviction of police officers and other
public officials who used their official positions to extort money, either
by instilling fear in their victims or by acting under color of official
right. When called before grand juries investigating the allegations,
10. Id. at 1359.
11. FED. R. CIrv. P. 37, provides in pertinent part:
.... (b) Failure to Comply With Order.
(1) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to
answer any question after being directed to do so by the court in the district
in which the deposition is being taken, the refusal may be considered a con-
tempt of that court ....
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1948):
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce
or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or ex-
tortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical vio-
lence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do any-
thing in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(2) The term 'extortion' means obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, vio-
lence, or fear, or under color of official right.
(3) The term 'commerce' means commerce within the District of Co-
lumbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce be-
tween any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia
and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same
State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which
the United States has jurisdiction . . ..
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many of the defendants perjured themselves by denying they had taken
money. 13
During their trials, and on appeal, all defendants uniformly con-
tested the extension of federal jurisdiction to "primarily local"'14 mat-
ters, which therefore resulted in an unconstitutional reach of the com-
merce clause under the Hobbs Acts. The court of appeals, in the first
case to present that argument, United States v. DeMet,1 considered
the conviction of a police officer who allegedly extorted money from
a tavern owner under threat of potential liquor license violations, and
harassment of the customers of the establishment. The facial attack
on the Hobbs Act in this case asserted that there was no discernible ef-
fect on interstate commerce and -thus the particular violation fell out-
side the power of Congress to legislate. The defendant argued that
the payment should be considered to be a bribe and not extortion.
In affirming the conviction, the court of appeals held that section
1951 was intended to protect against extortionate conduct resulting
from fear, actual or threatened, of economic harm, or by the actions
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970), provides as follows:
(a) Whoever under oath in any proceeding before or ancillary to any
court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material
declaration or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper,
document, record, recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain
any false material declaration, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
(b) This section is applicable whether the conduct occurred within or
without the United States.
(c) An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging
that, in any proceedings before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the
United States, the defendant under oath has knowingly made two or more dec-
larations, which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily
false, need not specify which declaration is false if-
(1) each declaration was material to the point in question, and
(2) each declaration was made within the period of the statute of
limitations for the offense charged under this section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in
the indictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction by
proof that the defendant while under oath made irreconcilably contradictory
declarations material to the point in question in any proceeding before or ancil-
lary to any court or grand jury. It shall be a defense to an indictment or infor-
mation made pursuant to the first sentence of this subsection that the defend-
ant at the time he made each declaration believed the declaration was true.
(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in
which a declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits such
declaration to be false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this section
if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially af-
fected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been
or will be exposed.
(e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for
conviction. It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular
number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence.
14. U.S. v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 812, 821 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Gill, 490
F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir. 1973).
15. 486 F.2d 812 (7th Cir. 1973).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
of one acting under color of official right. The court, conceding that
the extortionate conduct in the instant case had only an arguably de
minimis 16 effect on commerce, found the defendant was able to induce
"fear""7 in his victim, and that effect was present when the tavern
owner, who purchased goods from interstate commerce met the offi-
cer's demands in order to be free from intimidation. The court ac-
cepted a "depletion of assets" theory as a basis for showing the direct
effect on interstate commerce. In the subsequent cases, police officers
indicted for violations of section 1951 and related offenses presented
similar arguments, which the court of appeals disposed of within the
scope of its holding in DeMet. In each case, however, several differ-
ent approaches were presented by the defendants in an effort to de-
fend against the indictments.
In United States v. Gill,' the defendant was indicted for extor-
tion and for making a false material declaration before a grand jury.',
In denying that he demanded $300 to overlook arn alleged sale of
liquor to a minor, the assertion was made that the ratification of the
twenty-first amendment, repealing prohibition, placed control of all liq-
uor laws in the hands of the states. The defendant argued that the
interstate portion of liquor shipments ended when the goods came to
rest in warehouses in Illinois, and as such became intrastate com-
merce, beyond the reach of federal law. The court of appeals rejected
the applicability of the twenty-first amendment, holding that state
pre-emption in regulating liquor within its jurisdiction, does not pre-
clude the federal government from prohibiting extortion and its effect
on interstate commerce under the authority of the commerce clause.
The contention that extortion of $300 did not deplete assets and had
only a de minimus effect was again rejected.20 Congress has the
power to proscribe conduct that in any way or degree obstructs, delays
or affects commerce or the movement of articles or commodities in
commerce.
2 1
In United States v. Pacente the defendant was indicted for viola-
tion of section 1951 and for making a false material declaration to a
16. Id. at 822.
17. Fear as used in § 1951 includes not only fear from physical violence, but fear
of economic harm. Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955); United States v. Sophis, 362 F.2d 523, 527 (7th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966).
18. 490 F.2d 233 (7thCir. 1973).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970).
20. 490 F.2d at 236 (7th Cir. 1973).
21. Id. at 237.
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grand jury. Attacking the joinder of the two substantive charges, the
conviction, first considered by a panel of the court of appeals, was
reversed.22 The Government requested rehearing and the matter was
presented to the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc,2 3 which rejected the
prior decision and affirmed the conviction in the trial court. The de-
fendant contended that prejudice was an inevitable result when the ju-
rors heard evidence of the false grand jury testimony alleged to have
been made by defendant. The prejudice would manifest itself when
the jury considered -the question of his guilt under the extortion charge.
Finding no impropriety in the joinder under rule 8 (a)24 and rule 14,25
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court concluded that any
claim of prejudice was merely speculative, and that the trial court had
adequately instructed the jury not to consider the evidence adduced
before the grand jury as evidence of ,the commission of the crime of ex-
tortion.2 6 Chief Judge Swygert and Judge Sprecher, members of -the
original panel, dissented, and reiterated their position that the joinder
of the two substantive counts had "a double-teaming effect" on the
defendant.27
In United States v. Devitt,2" the defendant appearing before the
grand jury testified to a lack of recall or knowledge of engaging in
any extortionate conduct. He argued that the grand jury had suffi-
cient information for the indictment before calling him to testify, and
that the purpose of calling him was to force him into the position of
perjuring himself. The claimed effect was to make his testimony du-
plicitous, and therefore not "material", as was required for conviction
under section 1623. Judge Campbell, in his opinion, reaffirmed the
22. United States v. Pacente, 490 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1973).
23. United States v. Pacente, 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
24. FPED. R. Civ. P. 8(a):
(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the
same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the of-
fenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or
similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more
acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan.
25. FED. R. CIv. P. 14:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder
of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder
for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts,
grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice re-
quires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may or-
der the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in
camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the gov-
ernment intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
26. 503 F.2d at 547.
27. Id. at 553.
28. 499 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1974).
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broad powers of a grand jury to uncover Hobbs Act violations, and
held that the investigative process, duplicitous or not, was therefore
relevant and material to its inquiry. A "false material declaration",
as contemplated in section 1623,29 is one that has a natural effect
or tendency to impede, influence or dissuade a grand jury from pur-
suing its investigation. 30
The defendant in United States v. Nichols,"' attacked the federal
court's jurisdiction, and the grand jury investigation of his conduct as
the statute of limitations had run since the time he was alleged to have
committed the extortionate conduct being investigated. He further
contended that the warnings given to him by the United States Attorney
prior to his testimony were improper since he was not told that he was
a potential defendant in the investigation. 2 Finally, he alleged that
he was under duress at the time of his appearance before the grand
jury because a police department regulation required him to testify
or be subject to disciplinary measures within the department. In a
sweeping rejection of all of the defense arguments, the court noted that
the police department regulation had been previously declared uncon-
stitutional,"8 and that the Seventh Circuit adopts the common law
rule of duress, which requires a showing that the defendant must rea-
sonably fear death or serious bodily harm in order to avoid the conse-
quences of his own criminal acts. Likewise, the failure to warn the de-
29. Id. at 139.
30. See United States v. Stoner, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2nd Cir. 1970).
31. 502 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1974).
32. In United States v. Lardieri, 497 F.2d 317 (3rd Cir. 1974), the defendant made
a false material declaration to a grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. In re-
manding the case to the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit con-
sidered the recantation provisions of § 1623(d), which provide that a witness can admit
the falsity of his testimony if, "at the time the admission is made, the declaration has
not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity
has been or will be exposed." Id. Although the court did not find a duty on the part
of the government to give such a warning, if the prosecutor does undertake to warn,
the court suggests that the obligation to warn of § 1623(d) may attach. Such a recan-
tation would act as a bar to further prosecution under 1623. The court announced the
purpose of § 1623 was to have a witness testify before a grand jury to discover the truth
of the charges, and not to lay the foundation for an additional charge of perjury. See
18 U.S.C. § 1623(d).
33. See Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1973),
where Chicago Police Department Rule 51 was declared unconstitutional. That rule
prohibited police officers from refusing to give evidence to a grand jury, when properly
called upon, or refusing to give testimony under the claim of self-incrimination, or refus-
ing to sign a waiver of immunity. The court held that disciplinary action cannot be
taken against an officer for invoking a constitutional right under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment. See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Gardner v. Brod-
erick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392
U.S. 280 (1968).
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fendant of the consequences of his grand jury testimony may indicate
poor judgment on the part of the prosecutor, but it did not prejudice
the rights of the accused.
34
The Hobbs Act has been applied to cases involving persons in the
public trust, other -than police officers. In United States. v. Irali,'5
the defendant, a clerk in the Chicago City Hall, offered to help obtain
a liquor license for an individual who had difficulty in obtaining the
needed approval to commence business. The defendant represented
that upon receipt of a sum of money he could arrange for the immedi-
ate issuance of the license. After payment, the license did in fact is-
sue, and the victim opened the tavern for business. After denying the
transaction before the grand jury, the defendant was charged with per-
jury, and violation of section 1951. The indictment, in addition to al-
leging that the extortionate conduct involved the element of fear, also
charged that the defendant was acting under "color of official right ''"1
when he claimed that he had the ability to arrange for the immediate
issuance of the liquor license. The defense claimed a lack of federal
jurisdiction under section 1951, since there was no effect, de minimis
or otherwise, on the victim's business as it was not in existence at the
time of the issuance of the license. Without a viable business opera-
tion, there was no possible connection with interstate commerce. In
affirming the conviction, the court of appeals held that the defendant's
conduct offended the Hobbs Act because the victim had borrowed the
money to open the tavern, and the sums extorted by the defendant
constituted a substantial depletion of the total assets of the business.
The effect here was to delay the victim's ability to enter the market
place, engage in business, and make purchases from interstate com-
merce. The court further approved the application of the acting "un-
der color of official right" provisions of section 1951, since the victim
was led to believe that the defendant, acting with others, had the
ability and power to obtain the license.
In United States v. Staszcuk,3 the court of appeals reviewed the
conviction of an alderman who was charged solely with violation of -the
"color of official rights" provisions of section 1951. It was alleged
that the defendant had accepted money not to oppose a zoning change
within his ward. After the zoning approval had been obtained, the
34. See also United States v. DiMichele, 375 F.2d 959 (3rd Cir. 1967), which held
that there is no duty on the part of the government to explain rights to a witness prior
to testifying before a grand jury.
35. 503 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974).
36. Id. at 1299.
37. 502 F,2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974).
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proposed construction contract was cancelled, and no work had been
done on the project, although other construction was completed at that
site in conformity with the zoning laws. Alleging that the failure of
the contract defeated federal jurisdiction, the defendant moved for the
dismissal of the indictment. The prosecution, at trial, introduced the
testimony of three contractors who stated that had the contract been ex-
ecuted on the project that was abandoned, they would have made
purchases of building supplies that would have come from sources in
interstate commerce. The court of appeals, in affirming the convic-
tion count I and II, and reversing count III of the Hobbs Act viola-
tions, stated that the effect on interstate commerce in this case was
direct and demonstrable in those counts of the indictment where con-
struction was commenced and construction of other buildings was done
on the property zoned for that purpose. But, the court further held
-that in the instance where the defendant was alleged to have acted to
zone for a building that never materialized, and nothing was done
in furtherance of the failure or success of the extortion, then that
count of the indictment must be reversed, as the commerce element of
the Hobbs Act had not been proven.
The most recent case concerning this issue to come before the
court of appeals is United States v. Crowley.38 The defendant, a police
officer, was charged only with acting under color of official right
where he accepted money to prevent crimes from being committed on
the victims' premises, located in a racially changing area. The de-
fendant never performed any services for the victims, merely accepted
money on the pretense of providing protection while on and off duty.
The defendant predicated his case on the concept that he had been
bribed, and did not extort any funds from the victims, and in the ab-
sence of any allegation of instilling fear, his conduct fell outside the
scope of the Hobbs Act. The court, in considering the separation of
the fear concept and the official rights provision of the Act, stated that
the use of the conjunctive "or" between the clauses clearly demon-
strated that there are two separate and distinct types of conduct con-
templated by the statute.39 The defendant in this case accepted
money while in uniform to perform duties that he was required to do
within the scope of his official position. The defendant's uniform and
his office established a sufficient inducement on the victims to pay for
the purported services.
38. No. 73-1437 (7th Cir., Sept. 30, 1974).




In United States v. Cooks,4 ° the defendant was arrested in his
home, without a warrant, by agents who had obtained fresh informa-
tion that marijuana was on the premises. An officer knocked at the
door in an attempt to make a "buy and bust", and was confronted by
an individual wearing a shoulder holster and pistol. When another
occupant recognized the agent, the remaining agents moved in and
made an immediate search of the entire building. During that search
defendant was found sitting at a kitchen table with evidence which was
suppressed in the district court. The government appealed the suppres-
sion arguing that officers seeing an armed man were justified in enter-
ing the house without a warrant, and that a "protective sweep" was
necessary to protect those officers, who in the course of their sweep ob-
served the contraband in "plain view". The court of appeals, affirm-
ing the suppression of the evidence and ruling on the application of
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,4 held that nothing in the facts estab-
lished probable cause to make the arrest without a warrant. The
fourth amendment makes searches outside the judicial process unrea-
sonable unless they fall within several strictly defined exceptions. The
court of appeals in Cooks concluded that there was no showing made
to justify the right of the agents to be on the premises at the outset.
Observing evidence in "plain view" alone is not enough to justify a
search; the discovery of contraband here occurred after the agents had
made their entry and had almost concluded the "protective sweep".
The court in considering the government's continued justification of
the "protection sweep" concluded that it was too broad and not within
the rule of Chimel v. California.42 The exclusionary rule was properly
applied. 48
40. 493 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Gable, 473 F.2d 1274
(7th Cir. 1973) where the court of appeals struck down a "protective sweep" because
the defendant had a reputation for violence and on entering the residence police heard
"rustling noises" in the house.
41. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
42. 393 U.S. 958 (1968) (limiting warrantless searches incident to an arrest to the
area within the immediate control of the defendant).
43. See also Tritsis v. Backer, 501 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1974), a civil action against
federal agents for civil rights violations. Plaintiff claimed he was wrongfully arrested
and charged with an illegal weapons violation where defendant agents acted without
probable cause. Affirming a summary judgment of dismissal, the court of appeals
adopted the Second Circuit rule of Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), where police need only allege and prove that
they acted in good faith, that their conduct was lawful, and that the belief was reason-
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Consensual Searches
In United States v. Mattlock," the court of appeals approved the
suppression of evidence taken from the room of the defendant, without
having obtained his consent. Permission to search had been given by
another occupant of the residence who upon occasion shared the room
with the defendant and kept some personal effects there. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and in reversing the decision of the Seventh
Circuit, held that the consent given by one who possesses common au-
thority over premises or effects is a valid authorization to search in
the absence of the non-consenting party with whom that authority is
shared. 45
The Seventh Circuit then reached a similar result in Hayes v.
Cady, 4 when it was presented with a habeas corpus action. Without
reference to the holding in Mattlock, the court approved a search of
the defendant's residence predicated on permission obtained from a
landlady. The essential difference in Hayes was the defendant's de-
nial of a possessory interest in the premises sought to be searched,
thereby justifying police reliance on the permission of one who other-
wise logically and legally was entitled to grant it.4"
Warrants
In United States v. Carmichael48 the court of appeals, sitting en
banc, for the first time permitted collateral attack on the adequacy of
probable cause in a complaint for a search warrant, which was other-
able. Id. at 1348. In Tritsis, the agents submitted affidavits to that effect, and the court
of appeals held that plaintiff's counter-affidavits of a factual nature did not go to defend-
ants' state of mind, the real issue. 501 F.2d at 1023.
Proposed amendments to the federal rules are designed in part to make explicit that
probable cause for arrest warrants may be based on hearsay evidence. See, Advisory
Committee Note, Proposed Amendments to FED. R. CRiM. P. 4.
44. 476 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1973).
45. 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974).
46. 500 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974).
47. See also United States v. Piet, 498 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1974) where foreman
of warehouse containing defendant's goods gave permission to search, and court inter-
preted United States v. Matlock, 94 S. Ct. 988 (1974), to allow search where defendant
knew others had keys and access to his storage area, on grounds of lack of reasonable
expectation of privacy. Similarly, the court in United States v. Sells, 496 F.2d 912 (7th
Cir. 1974), allowed search, where permission was given by other than seller, on the basis
of reasonable belief by police of authority to give such permission. Defendant in Sells
also raised an issue of such permission being obtained fraudulently by police.
The Sixth Circuit this year extended this line of reasoning into the area of search
of a co-conspirator's premises, holding that one conspirator never has standing to object
to the search of another's premises. United States v. Hearn, 15 C.L.R. 2191 (6th Cir.,
May 7, 1974).
48. 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
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wise facially sufficient. In reversing and remanding to the trial court
for an evidentiary hearing, the court determined that the facts pre-
sented by defendant made an "initial showing" 49 sufficient to support
a belief that there had been a misrepresentation by a government agent
in procuring the search warrant. Setting up guidelines for the deter-
mination of the need for such a hearing on probable cause the court
said it should first be determined whether there had been "(1) any
misrepresentation by the government agent of a material fact, or (2)
an intentional misrepresentation by the government agent, whether or
not material."5  if ithe trial court concludes that such misrepresen-
tation was made, the exclusionary rule should be applied if the evi-
dence shows that the agent was either recklessly or intentionally un-
truthful.5 An innocent or merely negligent misrepresentation, whether
material or not, will not suffice as a basis for the suppression of evi-
dence. 5 2
Carmichael has not been overruled or modified, nor has the Su-
preme Court determined or considered such collateral attack on a
search warrant. 53  Several of the other circuits, however, are at
variance with its application54 and other cases decided in the Sev-
49. Id. at 988.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 989.
52. See also Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrants as a Ground for Suppressing
Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REv. 825 (1971).
53. See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S.
257 (1960) where the Supreme Court has indicated or assumed that such an attack may
be permissible.
54. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973)
takes a different approach. Although permitting collateral attack on the probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant, it has applied a different standard for weighing
the effect of misrepresentations in the affidavit. The court said "[A]ffidavits containing
misrepresentations are invalid if the error was (1) committed with an intent to deceive
the magistrate, whether or not the error is material to the showing of probable cause,
or (2) made non-intentionally, but the erroneous statement is material to the establish-
ment of probable cause for the search." Id. at 669.
The Ninth Circuit takes a third approach in a somewhat different factual situation.
In United States v. Damitz, 15 C.L.R. 2121 (9th Cir., Apr. 8, 1974), the informant
signed the affidavit for the search warrant, which contained false statements based on
information which he had given the agents. The agents were not aware of the falsity
in the warrant. Citing neither Carmichael, nor Thomas, the court upheld the warrant
by applying the reliability tests in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964); Spinelli
v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410 (1969); and United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971).
The attack on the probable cause to issue the warrant, said Judge Duniway, must be
confined to the four comers of the warrant. Had the agents sworn to the false and
material representations, a different result could have been reached.
The Eighth Circuit, sitting en bane in United States v. Marihart, 15 C.L.R. 2036
(8th Cir., Mar. 6, 1974), accepted the Carmichael rule. (Officer's uncertainty in recol-
lecting certain conversations was not a material misstatement made to secure a warrant.)
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
enth Circuit have distinguished or limited the rule. 55
At trial in United States v. Smith,56 the defendant moved to quash
the warrant and suppress evidence seized during a search of his home.
The affidavit, which detailed the surveillance of investigating govern-
ment agents, stated that odors were detected coming from the house
which, from the experience of the agent who obtained the warrant, in-
dicated that a certain process in the manufacture of a controlled sub-
stance was being conducted within the building. The defendant pre-
sented counter affidavits, executed by himself and a chemist, to es-
tablish that it would be impossible for a person to detect the particular
odor described in the warrant affidavit. Contending that the counter
affidavits established an "initial showing",5 7 the defendant requested
an evidentiary hearing to determine if there had not been a material
misrepresentation in the complaint for the warrant, within the rule of
Carmichael. The district court denied the defendant's motion, and the
court of appeals affirmed. In distinguishing Carmichael, the court
stated that it had read the agent's affidavit in Smith, and found suffi-
cient probable cause on its face for the issuance of the warrant. The
counter affidavits merely challenged the hearsay reported by the
agents, and as such did not constitute an "initial showing" of a mate-
rial or intentional misrepresentation by the agents. 58  The chemist's
opinions were likewise rejected by the court since it was logical to be-
lieve that the agent was in a better position to make such a subjective
determination of the odor and its source.
In United States v. Bridges,5 9 the defendant was indicted and
convicted for unlawful use and possession of a dynamite bomb to dam-
55. See also United States v. Ott, 489 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1973). Defendant was
convicted in the district court for possession of checks stolen from the mails. On cross
examination the defendant's attorney attempted to determine if the witness was em-
ployed as a government informer. The prosecution objected to the question and repre-
sented to the court that the witness was not, nor had he ever been, an informant. Dur-
ing arguments before the court of appeals, exhibits tendered by the defense showed that
the witness had in fact been a government informant and was mentioned by name in
the affidavit for warrant in the case of United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983 (7th
Cir. 1973). In reversing the Ott conviction, the court held that the government will
be charged with the knowledge of all its agents and employees, and whether a prosecu-
tor's statement was the result of neglect or a deliberate attempt to mislead the court,
such conduct by the prosecution cannot be condoned and is inconsistent with the fair ad-
ministration of justice. 489 F.2d at 874. The falacious statement by the government
at the trial denied the defendant the right to cross examine a major prosecution witness.
489 F.2d at 875, 877.
56. 499 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 255.
58. Id.
59. 499 F.2d 179 (1974) reversed on other grounds. See infra, note 226 and ac-
companying text.
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age a building. In the district court the defendant sought to suppress
the evidence obtained as a result of a search of his car with a war-
rant. The 'affidavit for the warrant stated that "dynamite" had been
found on the defendant's hands, and further -that he had submitted to
a swabbing of his hands on the advice of his attorney. Neither state-
ment proved to be true since -the chemicals detected on the defendant's
hands were only the "components of dynamite", 60 and the attorney had
not instructed his client to submit to the test. The court of appeals,
reversing the defendant's conviction on other grounds, upheld the va-
lidity of the search under the warrant, and rejected the applicability of
Carmichael in this instance. The court found that the differences in
the warrant, at best, could be considered only as "unintentional mis-
representations of an immaterial fact," which were excluded as grounds
for quashing a warrant.6
In United States v. Darrow,62 defendants were indicted for pos-
session of counterfeit currency. They had been arrested while in a
,tavern and the search of one defendant produced a set of car keys
for a vehicle bearing Kentucky plates and, without Miranda warn-
ings, one defendant made a statement indicating further evidence was
in that car. An officer went into the parking lot and found the car,
which was locked. Returning to the tavern, the officer requested the
owner of the car to identify himself but no one claimed ownership.
After secret service agents arrived and identified the bills as counter-
feit, one of them went to the parking lot and, peering through a win-
dow, observed a rolled-up sock on the front seat. A search warrant
was obtained for the car, and in the affidavit for warrant executed by
the officer it was asserted that the defendants admitted ownership of
the vehicle and told the officer that additional contraband would be
found in the vehicle. The defendant claimed these statements were
made without Miranda warnings. The court of appeals never reached
the question of the validity of the search warrant, but upheld the search
of the vehicle and the seizure of the evidence as a warrantless search
under Chambers v. Maroney.63 The Seventh Circuit found ample
probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant while it was
60. Id. at 185.
61. Id. See also United States Ex Rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, infra note 264 and
text accompanying, for an unusual case where warrant deficiencies result in suppression,
for the first time anywhere, of murder victim's body, on habeas corpus petition.
62. 499 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1974).
63. 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (automobile searches requiring special rules).
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still parked at ,the tavern, prior to the warrant application. The
court reasoned that the affidavit for the warrant was harmless error,
and over-diligence on the part of a police officer unnecessarily seeking
a warrant should not be penalized. 64  More important is the fact that
the appellate court recognized that the events in this case present a sig-
nificant constitutional question stemming from the trial court's suppres-
sion of the statement made to an officer without the required Miranda
warnings.6" Those statements were then used to establish probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant. The court declined to resolve the
issue because the search was ultimately justified as not requiring a war-
rant.66 The question of whether the exclusionary rule of Miranda and
other cases is applicable ,to probable cause determinations remains un-
resolved. 6
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Wire Tapping Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
And Safe Streets Act of 1968
The broad power to intercept oral communications without the
consent of the parties to the conversation has been controversial both
in terms of constitutional validity and application of the provisions of
the Act.6 Although a recent facial attack on the constitutionality of
the entire Act was rejected by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Ramsey,69 the court continues to deal with a multitude
64. 499 F.2d at 69.
65. Id. at 68.
66. Id.
67. The court never came to the point of considering the sufficiency of the af-
fidavit under the rule of U.S. v. Carmichael, supra note 50.
68. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1968).
In U.S. v. DeCesaro, 502 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1974), Judge Pell stated, "While gov-
ernmental interception of telephonic communications is the subject of stigmatic regard
by those devoted to the preservation of civil liberties and the right of privacy, Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2510 et
seq., permits such electronic surveillance subject to the safeguards and restrictions of that
Title."
69. 503 F.2d 524 (7th Cir., 1974).
In Ramsey the defendant, convicted of narcotics violations, attacked the constitu-
tionality of Title II1 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, supra
note 6, alleging as his ground the following: (1) authorization to listen continuously
to all conversations over a phone for 30 days was in the nature of a general warrant
forbidden by the fourth amendment; and (2) that the statute fails to require that notice
be given to every person whose conversations have been overheard. Although the de-
fendant failed to establish his standing to raise the issue, the court elected to rule on
the matter. While conceding that there will be violations of the Constitution in applying
the Act, the court of appeals reasoned that strict enforcement of the provisions of the
statute, and Court decisions such as Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), would
serve to guide the federal courts to substantial adherence with the fourth amendment.
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of problems created by the application of the procedural and fourth
amendment safeguards contained in the legislation. In United States
v. Roberts,7° federal agents obtained approval to tap the telephone of
the defendant under the provisions of section 251 6. 71  That section re-
quires that prior to court issuance of the warrant to intercept wire com-
munications, an authorization signed by the Attorney General or his
duly authorized assistant72 must accompany the affidavits to estab-
In U.S. v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1974) the question of notice to persons
whose conversations were overheard on a wire tap was considered. Defendants in that
case were not served with the statutory notice in § 2518(8)(d), of a tap on their con-
versations at the termination of the period set out in the warrant. The government had
failed to furnish that information to the district judge, and upon proper motion, an order
suppressing the evidence as to the defendant was issued. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
held that the government possessed the sole knowledge of who was overheard on the
taps, and what was said. The failure to disclose this to the judge deprived him of the
discretion as to what party was entitled to the information. In remanding to the district
court, the court of appeals did not rule on the question of suppression, but directed a
reconsideration of the matter in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Giorgano
and Chavez, infra note 70, as to the effect of failure to comply with the statutory re-
quirements under Title M11.
70. 477 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973).
On May 13, 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Giordano, 94 S. Ct.
1820 (1974) and U.S. v. Chavez, 94 S. Ct. 1849 (1974), ruled on the scope and applica-
tion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1968), dealing with authorization for wire interception.
Upholding the position of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Roberts, the court in
Giordano held that § 2516(1), required all applications for electronic intercepts be ini-
tiated by authorization of the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General who
has been specifically delegated with the power to represent the government in such cases.
Failure to comply with that procedure will result in suppression of evidence pursuant
to the provisions of § 2515. In Chavez, the Court distinguished part of its ruling in
Giordano as it applied to misidentification. Chavez involved two authorizations to tap.
The first was signed by the Attorney General's executive assistant. The Court found
this to be insufficient on its face pursuant to § 2518(10)(a) (ii). The second was desig-
nated as having been signed by an Assistant Attorney General, when in fact it had been
signed by the Attorney General himself. The misdesignation or identification was not
fatal to the authorization, said the Court, and the defendant's rights were not prejudiced,
nor should evidence obtained thereunder be suppressed.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1968):
(1). The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially
designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal
judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity
with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving the inter-
ception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion or a Federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of the of-
fense as to which the application is made, when such interception may provide
or has provided evidence of. ...
72. 18 U.S.C. 2518. Procedure for Interception of Wire or Oral Communications.
(1). Each application for an order authorizing or approving the intercep-
tion of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or
affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the applicant's
authority to make such application. Each application shall include the follow-
ing information: ...
(b). A full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued in-
cluding (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is
about to be omitted (ii) a particular description of the nature and location
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lish probable cause. The authorization in the instant case bore an
improper signature, which was discovered after an indictment for
gambling. The defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained
from the wire tap was upheld by the court of appeals, after it was
established that the letter purporting to have been signed by an Assist-
ant Attorney General had in fact been signed by another. The Seventh
Circuit, however, limited the scope of their ruling and held that only
information gained directly from the illegal wire taps would fall within
the exclusionary rule;73 thus if other independent evidence were dis-
covered to support the charge, the district court could proceed on the
indictment.
In United States v. McHale,7 the defendants attempted to apply
the suppression order in the Roberts case to the evidence obtained from
the interception of their communications. During pretrial discovery,
defendants learned that some of the calls uncovered in the Roberts
case had been made 'to an individual living in the same area as the
defendants, but who was in no way involved with the defendant's
gambling activities. Federal 'agents, using telephone company records,
informants and other independent sources had learned of the defend-
ants and their operation prior to the suppression of the Roberts evi-
dence, although the existence of the Roberts phone calls was men-
tioned in the affidavits for the interception order. The court of appeals
in affirming the conviction noted that the affidavits in the instant case,
stripped of any reference to Roberts, and coupled with the independ-
ent evidence obtained by the government, would support a finding of
probable cause.
The defendants also raised a unique argument, which was in-
tended to defeat federal jurisdiction. They asserted that the evidence
failed to prove that "6 or more persons" 75 were involved in gam-
of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be in-
tercepted .... (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the of-
fense and whose communications are to be intercepted ....
73. 18 U.S.C. 2518(10) (a) (1968):
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any
court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress
the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence de-
rived therefrom, on the grounds that-(i) the communication was unlawfully
intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was
intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the interception was not made
in conformity with the order of authorization or approval . . ..
74. No. 73-1860 (7th Cir., April 8, 1974).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b) (1) (ii) (Prohibition of Illegal Gambling Businesses):
• A u"(b) s sed in this section-
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bling since only three persons were indicted and some were only lay-
off bettors. In considering the requirement of having a statutory num-
ber of persons for federal jurisdiction to attach, the court held that the
act was intended to apply to professional gamblers, not customers or
bettors. But in counting the persons who fell into that category, run-
ners, agents or other independent contractors, such as "lay-off bet-
tors",7 6 would be included -to comply with the inclusion of those nu-
merically required to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 1955.
In United States v. McLeod,77 the defendant transmitted gam-
bling odds and results from Las Vegas to Indiana by public telephone.
Federal agents, who had her under surveillance, were able to stand
close enough to hear her relay to the party at the end of the line the
betting information she had obtained legally from her sources in Ne-
vada. No wire taps were involved and no court order existed author-
izing the interception of the defendant's oral communications. On in-
dictment, the defendant moved to suppress the conversations overheard
by the agents asserting that section 2510 prohibited the interception
of her phone conversations. 78  The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of the motion to suppress, and applying the Katz
79
decision held that what a person knowingly exposes to the public can-
not serve as a basis for seeking fourth amendment protection. Con-
versations, carried on in a normal tone of voice, and audible to the
agents standing near her, were not the type of conversations contem-
plated in section 2510, and the right to privacy had not been invaded
in a way capable of producing evidence capable of suppression.
In United States v. DeCesaro,80 the defendants were indicted for
(1) 'Illegal Gambling Business' means a gambling business which-
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, man-
age, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business . .
76. A "lay off bettor" is defined as:
(A) bookmaking business of any size requires that the bookmaker balance
his books . . . . In this way the bookmaker cannot be a loser . . . . (T)he
large scale bookmaker . . . tak(es) those bets on a favorite in excess of those
placed on the remainder of the participants in the contest and bet(s) them
again with an even larger bookmaker who is able to balance his books by tak-
ing all of these excess bets from many bookmakers in different locations. This
operation is known as 'laying off' . . . . (T)he bets thus insured are known
as 'lay off bets.'
United States v. DeCesaro, 502 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1974) (quoting from pretrial testi-
mony of F.B.I. Agent).
77. 493 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1974).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1968).
79. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), see also United States v.
Llanes, 389 F.2d 880 (2d Cir., 1968).
80. 502 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1974).
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gambling in violation of section 1955,81 and prior to trial filed mo-
tions for discovery and to suppress certain evidence obtained through
wire taps. The district court suppressed the evidence on the ground
that the affidavit executed by the federal agent contained primarily
the hearsay of a self-confessed bookmaker-informant, and was vague
and not easily understandable, thereby failing to establish probable
cause in the court's opinion. The government sought review of the
district judge's order. The court of appeals reversed and vacated the
suppression order, holding that hearsay evidence obtained from an in-
formant who was credible, although confessing to being a bookmaker,
would support probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. Applying
the United States v. Spinelli 2 decision, the court of appeals stated that
"only the probability, and not a prima facie showing of criminal ac-
tivity is the standard of probable cause". 83 The factual basis for
probable cause had clearly been established within the framework of
the affidavit.
In United States v. Finn,8 4 the defendants were charged with viola-
tion of section 1955, and moved to suppress evidence obtained from
intercepted wire communications. Prior to trial, the district court sup-
pressed the evidence obtained from -the taps, holding that the affidavit
executed by the federal agent failed to substantiate the reliability of
the major informant, and set out only hearsay facts dealing with the
underlying circumstances of gambling. As in DeCesaro, the court of
appeals reversed the district court and observed that although the affi-
davit on its face appeared to fail the two-fold test set out in Spinel-
li 5 since the affidavit failed to establish the reliability of the inform-
ant, other facts, and observations by F.B.I. agents and informants,
who were reliable, created the corroboration necessary to establish prob-
able cause. As to hearsay, -the court suggested that there were "multi-
ple levels of hearsay", 6 and that in testing to determine the hearsay
to be permitted, courts should decide if the source of the knowledge of
each declarant is sufficiently shown so as to be considered credible.87
81. 18 U.S.C. 1955 (1970): "(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, super-
vises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more
than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
82. 393 U.S. 410 (1968).
83. 502 F.2d at 610.
84. 502 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1974).
85. 393 U.S. 410 (1968).




Although the area comprising the geographical jurisdiction of the
Seventh Circuit is not usually associated with border searches, the lo-
cations of O'Hare Field88 and the great lakes ports, and increased ac-
tivities of narcotics smuggling89 have nonetheless created problems
here connected with border searches. Such searches fall outside most
of the traditional protections of the fourth amendment,90 leading the
courts to 'apply various statutory provisions in deciding the cases. 9 '
In a case of national first impression the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction of defendant for importing nar-
cotics into the United States by mailing cocaine in a first class enve-
lope from a foreign country. The envelope was opened by customs
officials in New York and its contents dicovered 9 2  In United States
v. Odland,93 the court rejected the defendant's contention that cus-
toms officials were without authority to open first class mail,94 and
that a search warrant based in part on the opened mail was improp-
erly granted.9 5
The court held that first class mail is protected from unwarranted
inspection only if it is of domestic origin. Basing its analysis on cases
from other circuits which, while not approaching the problems encoun-
tered with first class mail, had allowed -the government a broad bor-
der search authority,9 6 the court found that the power of the govern-
ment to inspect private mail of any class at the point of entry is un-
limited.
In what is apparently dicta, however, the court did recognize some
limitations on the border search power of the Government in United
88. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (airport bor-
der search).
89. See, e.g., Acree, This Is Customs, 1 DRuG ENFORCEMENT, Spring, 1974, at 10-
11 (Drug Enforcement Administration, Dept. of Justice).
90. See United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1974). According to the
court, this problem has yet to be faced by the Supreme Court, although dealt with in
several other circuits. See Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Stornini,
443 F.2d 833, 835 (1st Cir. 1971). See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
153 (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
91. See 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1866); 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1930); 19 C.F.R. § 162.6.
92. It was then delivered to defendant under controlled conditions in Wisconsin.
502 F.2d at 152.
93. 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1974).
94. Defendants relied upon 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (1970), and 39 C.F.R. § 61.1.
95. 502 F.2d at 152.
96. See supra, note 90,
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States v. Brown,9 7 which involved a search of defendant's person.
While the court of appeals upheld a search under a female defendant's
clothing by customs inspectors at O'Hare International Airport, it did
so in a decision discussing at length the concepts of "reasonable sus-
picion", "real suspicion", and the limitations in body searches by
"common standards of decency and propriety". 98  While concluding
in the case only that the level of suspicion harbored by the customs in-
spectors was "high enough" to allow a "relatively dignified search", 99
the court intimates that a higher level of suspicion may be required
to justify a stripping or strip search, or an intrusion into body ori-
fices. 10 0 In these situations, Brown indicates that a "mere" suspicion
would be insufficient, and that the courts should require a showing of
"real suspicion" on the part of a prudent customs officer, based on
clearly ascertainable facts indicating that a suspect is concealing
something on his person. 10
In a shorter section of the Brown decision, the court also allowed
the customs officials' search of another defendant who had, prior to the
search discussed above, departed from the actual customs area in the
airport and who was, on the basis of the prior search, returned to the
inspection area. Citing only one case from another circuit on this
problem, the court in -allowing the second search noted approvingly
the lower court decision of Brown and its language regarding "reason-
able grounds to suspect" based on the first search.
1 2
The rules of Brown, vague as they are, are apparently the
only ones for the Seventh Circuit. That decision preceded by one and
a half months the statement in Odland that "we of course express no
view on what have been termed extended border searches or intrusive
personal searches."'10 3
97. 499 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1974).
98. Id. at 833, where the court cites several other circuits. See, e.g., United States
v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1973) ("reasonable suspicion"); Henderson
v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir., 1967) ("real suspicion"); United States
v. Storm, 480 F.2d 701, 704 (5th Cir. 1973) ("common standards").
99. 499 F.2d at 834.
100. Id. at 833. But see United States v. Chase, 503 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Customs order to strip not automatically effective as "strip search", with prerequisite
of real suspicion).
101. 499 F.2d at 833.
102. Id. at 834.
103. Odland, supra, 502 F.2d at 151, citing Note, Border Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968). But see Almeida--Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973) (must satisfy normal fourth amendment requirements except at





In United States v. Fowler' a sixteen year old boy was arrested,
charged with participation in the burglary of a post office and sub-
sequently prosecuted as a juvenile.'1 5 The evidence indicated that he
was given only limited warnings under Miranda v. Arizona,1 6 in that
postal inspectors did not fully advise him of his right to an attorney, 10 7
or that his statements could be used in evidence against him. The
court of appeals held that these omissions created prejudice to the ju-
venile, and warranted reversal of the district court conviction. Con-
sidering the Supreme Court decisions of In re Gault'08 and other ju-
venile cases, 10 9 the Seventh Circuit held that minors are entitled to
many of the same protections and constitutional safeguards as adults.
More interesting than the Fowler court's application of Miranda
requirements to juveniles, however, is the reasoning used in reaching
a final decision. Cases from the Supreme Court are cited by the ma-
jority in their rejection of a parens patriae approach to the treatment
of juveniles,"' in reasoning which awards the rights of an adult to the
child. But in the portion of the decision analyzing the sufficiency of
the warnings given, that majority reassumes its paternal cloak, re-
calls to mind the insecurities of adolescence,"' and seems to say that
special care must be given to the juvenile who is unable to fend for
himself." 2
104. 476 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1973).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1948).
106. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
107. In its holding, the court specifically declines to decide whether the absence of
an attorney at a juvenile interrogation per se renders a confession involuntary. 476 F.2d
at 1094.
108. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
109. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962). The court also distinguishes the pre-Gault Seventh Circuit decision of United
States ex rel. Richardson v. Vitek, 395 F.2d 478, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1968) (habeas
corpus) reviewing People v. Richardson, 32 Ill. 2d 472, 207 N.E.2d 478, cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1021 (1966).
110. Supra, note 109, cases cited.
111. The majority, 476 F.2d at 1093, distinguished one case used by the government,
West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968) (juvenile may knowingly
waive Miranda rights), noting in that case indications of the juvenile's maturity and in-
dependence. The dissent, doubting but assuming the requirement of Miranda warnings
here, found them adequate. 476 F.2d at 1094 (Kilkenny, Senior Circuit J., dissenting).
112. This circuit also decided, however, that some arguably incompetent defendants
need not be given Miranda-type warnings on the right to silence by examining govern-
ment psychiatrists. Relying on its previous case of United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d
54, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1971) (such examinations do not per se violate fifth amendment
rights). The court extended that holding to cover the advisement situations in United
States v. Green, 497 F.2d 1068, 1081 (7th Cir. 1974).
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The defendant in United States v. English"' established that he
had been addicted to heroin for many years, and contended that after
his arrest for murder he was denied drugs or medical attention, and
became ill. Claiming that he was without such aid or treatment for
three days, and was suffering from withdrawal when he gave a con-
fession to the authorities, he sought to suppress that confession as in-
voluntary and solely as a result of the narcotics withdrawal. The de-
fendant did not allege a failure to warn under Miranda.
114
Evidence was adduced from the testimony of several agents that
there were in fact no signs of withdrawal, and the trial court concluded
that the defendant had failed to show any factual basis for the
claimed involuntariness. The appellate court affirmed, and held that
as the self-serving statements of the defendants were unsupported, the
confession was not suppressable. The question of the voluntariness of
that confession, and the weight to be given it, were properly for the
jury's consideration under an appropriate instruction from the court.
TESTIMONY
At the trial in United States v. Zouras,115 the prosecutor sought
on cross examination to establish as impeachment the fact that a wit-
ness had previously refused to make any statement to federal officers
regarding the defendant."1 6  The defendant objected to this tactic
claiming that such comment on a witness' prior silence compromised
that witness's fifth amendment rights. The court of appeals held that
while the witness did have the right to remain silent at the time of her
own interrogation, since she was neither a defendant in the case, nor
under any charge, it was not -a violation of her fifth amendment privi-
lege for the prosecutor to comment on her refusal to speak. The rights
afforded under the Constitution inure only to the person, 1 7 and in
113. 501 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1974).
114. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
115. 497 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1974).
116. As to comments on the silence of defendant himself, at whatever stage in the
proceeding-including initial questioning-the Seventh Circuit continued to warn the
government of its opposition to such tactics. United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179,
183 (7th Cir. 1974) (questions to agent on direct as to defendant's interrogation an-
swers, require reversal). Two months later the court, in what is plainly labelled dicta,
also warned the government on the practice of commenting on its own uncontested evi-
dence, when the record indicates that only defendant could have controverted such evi-
dence. This would be an improper comment on defendant's silence. United States v.
Fearns, 501 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Handman, 447 F.2d 853, 855-
56 (7th Cir. 1971) (test is effect on jury).
117. Citing Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913) (books and rec-
ords).
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such a situation may only be claimed personally. Thus the defendant
had no stake in the witness's fifth amendment right. 18
On the other hand, a defense witness may use that personal privi-
lege on cross-examination. Without the opportunity for such wit-
nesses to remain silent under the fifth amendment, the court held in
Wisconsin ex. rel. Monsoor v. Gagnon,"9 the principal defendant's
right to call witnesses in his own defense is improperly abridged.
Thus, defendant's witness may plead a personal fifth amendment
privilege on cross-examination without fear of having his answers on
direct striken for failure to submit to cross-examination. 20
In a distinct area of testimonial privilege, the Seventh Circuit ,this
year further limited the privilege against testimony of a spouse. Ex-
panding upon its own prior decisions,' 2 ' the court in United States v.
Van Drunen22 stated that the privilege will not apply where both
spouses have participated in the alleged offense. Distinguishing a
contrary Supreme Court decision, 123 the court found the facts of Van
Drunen to be sufficiently different due to the alleged joint participa-
tion, and further went so far as to hold that "we decline to read the
Hawkins opinion as foreclosing the possibility of other exceptions"." '
This decision creates for 'the Seventh Circuit a complete exception to
marital privilege where joint participation of the spouses is alleged,
which now applies to both the privilege against testimony and the
privilege for confidential marital communications. 12 5
118. United States v. Zouras, 497 F.2d 1115, 1120 (7th Cir. 1974).
119. 497 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1974); see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19
(1967) (right to compulsory process).
120. Government witnesses may also refuse some questions on cross examinations.
The court reaffirmed its sixth amendment-confrontation exception as to the back-
ground of U.S. agent in personal safety context. United States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105,
1108 (7th Cir. 1974) (address of agent). See also United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d
1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971) (address and place of employ-
ment, co-conspirators becoming government witnesses).
For a discussion of one co-conspirator's claim to another's rights as to search, an
analogy to 5th Amendment testimonial privilege with similar results, see United States
v. Hearn, supra note 47.
121. United States v. Doughty, 460 F.2d 1360, 1363 (7th Cir. 1972) (tax returns
prepared by wife); United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194 (7th Cir. 1972) (wiretap
including wife's conversation-wife joint participant in crime) reversed on other grounds
415 U.S. 143 (1974), delendant's appeal on marital privilege, cert. denied 411 U.S. 986
(1973). Cf. Note, Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communications Privilege, 77
HA.v. L. REV. 730, 734 (1964).
122. 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974).
123. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958); but see Wyatt v. United
States, 362 U.S. 525, 531 (1960) (husband leading wife into prostitution might lead her
to silence).
124. 501 F.2d at 1397.
125. See Kahn v. Doughty, supra note 121, 471 F.2d at 194. The court of appeals
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OTHER EVIDENCE UNDER FIFTH AMENDMENT
In a situation much like that in Zouras, the defendant in
United States v. Manson1 2 sought to suppress the income tax returns
of his employee in an illegal gambling business. In Manson, how-
ever, the defendant also alleged that the information used to prepare
the return had originated with him. Reiterating the personal nature of
the fifth amendment privilege, the court denied suppression and noted
the unavailability of that privilege to one supplying information to an
accountant.
127
Later this year, the court also interpreted Schmerber v. Califor-
nia 2s to allow the taking of swab samples from the hands of a defend-
ant. Holding that such swabs are not of a testimonial or communi-
cative nature, the court found in United States v. Bridges 29 that it was
unnecessary to look for a defendant's consent to affirm the district
court's admission of the swabs.130
And finally, the requirement in narcotics cases that a defendant af-
firmatively overcome the presumption that he does not have the ap-
propriate license was found compatible with the fifth amendment in
United States v. Kelly.' 3' Relying on prior Seventh Circuit cases deal-
ing with federal food and drug laws,' 3 2 the court distinguished the
Supreme Court case of Leary v. United States,13 3 contending that
Leary should be limited to a ban on presumptions going to the elements
of an offense. The statutory presumption134 in Kelly, on the other
hand, merely creates an affirmative defense, shifting the burden of go-
ing forward with the evidence.
135
in United States v. Cleveland, 477 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1973) also adopted a prefer-
ence for a Second Circuit ruling which allows testimony by a government agent as to
statements by a spouse. United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 1968);
but see United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1971), where defendant and
wife were co-conspirators, but statements made as to inter-spousa communications on
conspiracy not allowed. Id. at 898.
126. 494 F.2d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 1974).
127. See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 337 (1973) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (privilege as to records in custodial safekeeping).
128. 384 U.S. 755 (1966) (blood samples).
129. 499 F.2d 179, 184 (7th Cir. 1974).
130. The court also relied on the Second Circuit's United States v. D'Amico, 468
F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1969) (hair clippings) in finding that the fourth amendment
requirements on reasonable intrusion were satisfied in U.S. v. Bridges, 499 F.2d at 184.
131. 500 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1974).
132. United States v. Rowlette, 397 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1968) (amphetamines, bur-
den on defendant); United States v. Reiff, 435 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1970) cert. denied,
401 U.S. 938 (1971) (keeping of records).
133. 395 U.S. 6, 45-46 (1969) (presumption of importation, marihuana).
134. 21 U.S.C. § 885(b) (1970).
135. While the majority worried at some length over the use of conclusive labels,
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MERGER AND JOINDER OF COUNTS
In United States v. Hunter,"'8 the defendants were convicted for
conspiracy to violate the provisions of the organized crime control
Act of 197017 which prohibited illegal gambling, and for substantive
violations under the same act. The court of appeals held 'that con-
spiracy to violate the gambling provisions, which require the involve-
ment of five or more persons acting in concert, completed the of-
fense, and would not serve as satisfaction of the requirement for
conspiracy that two or more persons act in agreement, where the ele-
ments for each offense are identical. The court reversed the conspir-
acy conviction and -affirmed the substantive gambling conviction.
The Hunter holding was specifically limited, however, in United
States v. McLeod. 3 ' There, the court found that the substantive convic-
tion of defendant under 18 U.S. §§ 1084 and 19521 9 differed from
the "five or more" requirement in Hunter14 ° a section 1955 prose-
cution-as there are no requirements in these sections that there be
more than one person 'to complete the offense. As 'a result, the ele-
ments of proof are more distinct. In this situation, then, it is immate-
rial that some of the same evidence is used to prove both the substan-
tive and conspiracy counts. Hunter seems limited by McLeod to situ-
ations where the substantive offense would require a conspiracy.
In a similar case, a prosecution under 26 U.S.C. § 5861141 for
possession of a destructive device, the court also dealt with the prob-
lem of a single course of conduct. In United States v. Tankersley, 42
the court of appeals adopted the Ninth Circuit's rule and reasoning.4
Judge Stevens in concurrence found no difficulty distinguishing the difference between
the proof of an element of an offense and proof of an affirmative defense's existence.
Kelly, 500 F.2d at 74.
136. 478 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1973).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970).
138. 493 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1974).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970).
140. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
141. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5861(i) (1968).
142. 492 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1974).
143. United States v. Clements, 471 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1972). Also in the area
of merger of offenses, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Dilts, 501 F.2d 531 (7th
Cir. 1974), that each security cashed by defendant may be the basis for a separate in-
dictment, and in such case allows an assumption that each crosses a state line separately.
The court distinguishes Castle v. United States, 368 U.S. 13 (1961) (Mem.) reversing
287 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1961). Choosing among the circuits, divided on this issue, the
court of appeals followed the Eighth Circuit. Amer v. United States, 367 F.2d 803, 805
(8th Cir. 1966).
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that where such multiple prosecutions are brought under Section 5861,
multiple convictions may stand, but cumulative punishment is limited
to the maximum allowed for a single count. 4 4 Nor is it improper for
the government to bring both a substantive count and a grand jury per-
jury count relating to the same issue. In United States v. Pacente,'45
the court reaffirmed its stand on the discretionary nature of sever-
ance, 146 where reversal is available only on a showing that discretion
has been abused. 4 7 With two dissents, 14 the court en banc held that
speculation on the cumulative nature of the proof with these counts,
the effect of the grand jury's determination of perjury on the petit
jury's fact finding as to the counts, and the ability of that petit jury to
distinguish the elements and levels of proof required, do not of them-
selves show such an abuse. The court found that curative instruc-
tions, with the presumed ability of a juror to apply them, will prevent
the prejudice claimed by the defendant. Without that prejudice, pub-
lic interest in court efficiency allows the joinder of connected of-
fenses. 49
The court stretched the reach of its prior guidelines'5" on joinder
and severance in United States v. Zouras."' There, the court found
that it was not prejudicial to join counts which alleged that defendant
had both committed the substantive crime, and attempted by extortion
to prevent a principal witness from testifying as to that substantive
count. The defendant's scheme to commit the substantive count, the
court found, included a scheme to conceal such activity from the police,
which scheme in turn included the extortion scheme. Thus, while the
inclusion in the Hunter scheme of the conspiracy to commit the sub-
stantive crime caused the offenses to merge, the court in Zouras sought
out such a scheme to permit joinder of offenses.
144. 492 F.2d at 962.
145. 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc), reversing 490 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.
1973).
146. FED. R. CaIm. P. 14 (severance); FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) (Joinder).
147. See United States v. Rogers, 475 F.2d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 841 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967).
148. 503 F.2d at 553 (Swygert, Ch. J., dissenting); id. (Sprecher, J., dissenting).
149. Citing United States v. Rogers, supra note 12, 475 F.2d at 828.
150. See United States v. Quinn, 365 F.2d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1966), holding as
joinder requirements that the crimes must be (1) of the same or similar character, (2)
based on the same act or transaction or (3) constituting part of a common scheme or
design.
151. 497 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1974).
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DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE BY PROSECUTION
In United States v. Krilich,52 the court of appeals, relying on
prior Seventh Circuit cases,1 53 affirmed a conviction based in part on
the testimony of agents to whose reports the defendant had been denied
access before trial. More recently, however, the court in United
States v. Cleveland'5 ruled that an I.R.S. agent's report is discover-
able in some cases. At trial, the defense in Cleveland demanded that
an I.R.S. agent's report be furnished to the defendant under the provi-
sions of the Jencks Act.'55 The district judge there stated only that he
would "take a look", 56 in camera, to determine if there was any-
thing in the report which related to the agent's testimony. Although
there was nothing in the record to indcate such an inspection, it was
held that the agent's report was not a statement within the purview of
section 3500157
Remanding, the court of appeals stated that under section 3500,
two considerations must be made to determine discoverability. First, it
must be determined whether a document falls within the statutory def-
inition of a statement in section 3500(e).'58 While the court deter-
mined that the agent's report will indeed fit this definition of a state-
ment,159 it also concluded that a trial court must apply a second
test. That is, does the content of the report relate to the witness' testi-
mony at trial, 6 ° and therefore require production under subsection
(b) of section 3500,161 The remand in Cleveland, it should be noted,
152. 470 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1972), reconsidered and affirmed, 502 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1974).
153. E.g., United States v. Keig, 334 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1964).
154. 477 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1974).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
156. 477 F.2d at 315.
157. Id.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1970):
(e) The term 'statement', as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this
section in relation to any witness called by the United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted
or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcrip-
tion thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such
oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any,
made by said witness to a grand jury.
159. See United States v. O'Brien, 444 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1971) (definition of
"statement").
160. The court held that the views of a prospective government witness who was
not called are not thereafter subject to disclosure. United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d
1068, 1083 (7th Cir. 1974).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1970):
(b) After 4 witness called by the United States has testified on direct eyt-
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included provision for a sealed transmission of the report to the court
of appeals for further review should the trial court again find -that it
was not producible under the tests set out.
Following the Cleveland decision, Krilich moved to vacate his
prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,162 re-alleging a denial of
access to the agent's report during his first trial. Basing the further
action on Cleveland, the defendant claims that the first Krilich hold-
ing had denied his constitutional rights of confrontation and effective
assistance of counsel."6 3 At the section 2255 hearing, defendant
readily established for the district court a similarity between his case
and the facts in Cleveland. The district court nevertheless denied his
petition, and held for a prospective application of Cleveland.
The court of appeals concurred and held in the second Krilich'"
that there are two instances where a new rule is to be applied retroac-
tively. First, a rule which, if applied retroactively, would have pre-
vented the original -trial from taking place rather than merely pre-
scribing procedural rules to govern its conduct, should apply retroac-
tively.' 6 5 Second, if the retroactive application of a rule would re-
move a substantial impediment to the original -trial's truth finding
function, 66 and so raises a serious question as to the accuracy of a
prior guilty verdict, such application is given. Having established these
criteria, the Krilich court cited two Supreme Court' 67 cases to justify
four further balancing tests: (1) how well did other safeguards pro-
tect the court's fact finding function; (2) what purpose do the new
standards serve; (3) how much did law enforcement authorities rely
on the old standards; and (4) what effect would retroactive applica-
tion of the new standards have on the administration of justice?
A different problem with discovery arose in United States v. Eng-
amination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States
to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the posses-
sion of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the
subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be
delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1949).
163. The court held that the purpose of disclosure in this situation would be to allow
defendant a meaningful confrontation. Krilich v. United States, 502 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.
1974).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973) (double jeopardy).
166. The court also cites Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1969) to
the effect that such a result must also be the purpose of a new rule. 502 F.2d at 684.
167. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 297 (1967).
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lish.'6 8  In English, the government delayed delivery ' 69 of material
to the defendant under a discovery order, pleading that such deliv-
ery could prejudice its case against potential co-defendants who,
though unindicted, were represented by the same attorney. The
court of appeals held that this delay was not frivolous, and that the
facts presented a real danger of conflict of interest. 170  The court also
apparently approved the trial judge's decision to condition discovery on
a hearing to determine the propriety of the original defendant's waiver
of independent counsel.
GUILTY PLEAS
The defendants, after the court denied motions to suppress, en-
tered into plea bargaining with the district judge which resulted in the
entry of guilty pleas to narcotics violations. As part of the
bargaining reached during negotiations for the plea, the district judge
agreed that the defendants could raise on appeal the basis for his de-
nial of their motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search at
O'Hare Field. The prosecutor objected to such a proviso in the agree-
ment for the sentence. In conformity with the agreement, the defend-
ants appealed the rejection of their motion to suppress. The court of ap-
peals, in United States v. Brown, 1 after affirming the ruling on sup-
pression, turned its attention to the propriety of the district court's
agreement in the plea bargaining process. Although the appellate
court elected to honor the commitment made by the district judge, it
was held that they would be reluctant to entertain such a stipulation in
the future. Adopting the position taken in another circuit in United
States v. Cox, 172 and in Tollett v. Henderson,"17 it was suggested that
the defendants were gaining the best of two worlds, since they had
freely proclaimed their guilt and then were permitted to raise new
claims of innocence by virtue of a dubious agreement confering appel-
late jurisdiction on a reviewing court. The court of appeals suggested
strongly that such procedures be discontinued in future cases.' 74
168. 501 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1974).
169. In United States v. Robinson, 503 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1974), the court avoided
defendant's contention that government actions which arguably prevent any discovery
(through destruction) of potentially exonerating evidence, require reversal regardless of
the government's good or bad faith. Defendant's trial tactics obscured, and thus waived,
the issue. Id. at 218. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
170. See Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
171. 499 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1974).
172. 464 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1972).
173. 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
174. 499 F.2d at 832. The Brown court also examined the ability of one possibly
under the influence of drugs to intelligently enter a plea of guilty. Denial of defend-
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SPEEDY TRIAL
In United States v. Macino,175 another case articulating a new
rule for the Seventh Circuit, the defendants alleged a violation of their
rights to a speedy trial in the twenty-six month delay between their
initial arrest and the return of an indictment. They had, however,
been free on bond during the entire period, and they made no demand
for trial until after indictment. Reversing, the court of appeals stated
that it was compelled to adopt the balancing tests of Barker v. Win-
go,17 where the Supreme Court announced four factors to be consid-
ered in finding such a violation of the sixth amendment's speedy trial
protections. The Barker tests were: (1) length of delay: (2) reason
for delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to
defendant. 177  The fourth test, prejudice, must be further measured by
the interests to be protected: (1) prevention of excessive pre-trial in-
carceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the defend-
ant; and (3) impairment of the defense.17 1
The defendant in Macino was not penalized for failure to de-
mand trial as the failure did not constitute a waiver, but was only one
factor to be considered. 179  Nor did the prosecution in Macino have
an explanation for the lengthy delay, another factor which had 'to be
considered in defendant's favor.180  The ,twenty-six month delay was
not in and of itself prohibited, the court of appeals held, but such
lengthy delay can trigger the speedy trial issue, particularly the ques-
tion of prejudice. The apparently critical element was the actual
prejudice resulting from the delay. Prejudice can result when the de-
ant's contention on that point was based on defendant's failure to raise it at the time
of the plea, and on the court's personal observation. Id. at 835.
175. 486 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1973).
176. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
177. 486 F.2d at 752.
178. Id. at 753. While citing as a proposition of United States v. Strunk, 412 U.S.
434 (1973), appeal from 467 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1972), that it is not a remedy for lack
of speedy trial, the court in United States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1974)
added as another factor the sentencing of defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2)
(1958).
179. But see 486 F.2d at 755 (Moore, J., dissenting).
180. See United States v. English, 501 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1974). The Seventh
Circuit in English found no prejudice where the government could explain a four month
delay as a result of defendant's repudiation of an oral confession, initial waiver of pre-
liminary hearing and subsequent renewed demand for such hearing. See also United
States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1974), where the court took judicial notice
of reasons for an 11 month post-indictment delay, including difficulty of proof for gov-
ernment and fact that trial judged newly appointed. But see U.S. v. Jackson, 15 C.L.R.
2130 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (government delay of discovery causing 17 month trial delay re-
quires dismissal).
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lay 'affects the defendant's ability to preserve his defense, as in this
case, where one potential witness died during the interim and the rec-
ord showed faded memories in others. In balancing, as per Baker,
the court found a violation of the right to a speedy trial.181
In other sixth amendment speedy trial appeals, the Seventh Circuit
dealt with the problem of pre-indiotment delays by the government
without the arrest seen in Macino. Interpreting a recent Supreme
Court decision to the effect that speedy trial protections do not ap-
ply until a putative defendant becomes an accused, 182 the Seventh
Circuit held that simply targeting a suspect for investigation does not
qualify him as "accused". 8 3 Thus, a right to speedy trial will not nor-
mally, under United States v. Joyce, 18 accrue until the defendant is
actually indicted. Further, without a specicific showing of prejudice, the
defendant's only protection in such a situation will normally be the
statute of limitations.
The effect of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act'8 5 on a
defendant's right to speedy trial was also examined this year. In
United States v. Ricketson s6 the court held the defendant to strict com-
pliance with written notice requirements as to some sections of the Act
and also defined the starting point for the time limitations in other
sections. The court held that when the United States Attorney has not
actually lodged a detainer with state officials, prior appearances in
federal court by a defendant in state custody will not act as such a
starting point for those limitations. Instead, the 'time starts to run
only at the point where such a request has been made by the govern-
ment. Prior appearances for arraignment or other purposes are im-
material when the government wants the defendant's presence only for
short periods and has no intention of holding him until trial.'8 7
181. But see, United States v. DeTienne, 468 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1973). See also,
United States v. Cabral, 475 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Taddeo, 434
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 944 (1971.); United States v. Lebosky,
413 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 952 (1970).
182. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971).
183. 499 F.2d 9, 19 (7th Cir. 1974).
184. Id.
185. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, § 1003-8-9 (1973).
186. 498 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1974).
187. Where a federal detainer had in fact been lodged with state authorities in
United States v. Skelly, No. 73-1863 (7th Cir., June 7, 1974), the court held a delay
in arraignment on the federal charges not prejudicial. Skelly also complained of a viola-
tion of his right under FED. R. Cium. P. 5(a) on a delay of such arraignment while he
was held on a related state charge. The court held that this merely constitutes a delay
in arrest, a pre-indictment delay not prejudicial to defendant, and also held that while
defendant is so held by a state, the federal government may continue any investigation
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In United States v. Haygood,l ss the defendant purchased drugs in
Detroit and sold them in Chicago. Separate indictments issued for
the two transactions, and were assigned to different judges in the
same district. Plea bargaining resulted in a reduction of one charge,
to which defendant pleaded guilty. A pre-sentence investigation, sub-
mitted after that plea, referred to the remaining indictment and set
forth all the underlying facts. Those facts, including those still
charged in the remaining indictment, were then relied upon in sentenc-
ing on the guilty plea. When the government proceeded to prosecute
on the remaining charge, defendant claimed that reliance on it in the
prior sentencing procedure would require that continued prosecu-
tion be seen as double jeopardy.
While the court of appeals found the procedure here unfair, they
nonetheless found also that double jeopardy did not attach under these
facts. Jeopardy attaches when a jury is impanelled or, in a bench
trial, when evidentiary proceedings commence. When a sentencing
judge obtains evidence of other charges or convictions they are used
only for the purpose of imposing sentence, and are not evidentiary in
nature; nor does that disclosure relate to the question of guilt or inno-
cence. Their consideration by the sentencing judge does not then
grant defendant a future transactional immunity.
Although affirming in Haygood, the Seventh Circuit did make
plain its distaste for the result in this case. Prosecutors should encour-
age one final disposition of all pending charges.' 89 The court gave
tacit approval to the Wisconsin "read-in" procedure. Under that pro-
cedure, prosecutor and accused may make an enforceable agreement
under which those offenses relied on by a sentencing judge may not
without incurring an obligation to arraign defendant in order that he be afforded
his right to counsel in preparation for defense on the related federal charge. Id., slip
opinion at 4. See also United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974).
188. 502 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1974).
189. Id. at 169:
In a practical sense, therefore, the prosecutor has two opportunities to use one
charge as a basis for imposing what he regards as an adequate sentence. The
constitutional protection is intended to forestall such unfairness and to give a
defendant the right to one final disposition of any pending charge. (footnotes
omitted).
But the court in In re: Special Sept., 1972 Grand Jury, Lufman v. United States, 500
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1974), found that defendant's two refusals to supply information
to the grand jury did not constitute double jeopardy. Defendant, originally granted im-
munity, had refused to answer questions regarding others and was sentenced for civil
contempt. Later, defendant refused to give voice exemplars to the same grand jury, this
time seeking to indict him, and was found to be in criminal contempt. Id. at 1285.
CRIMINAL LAW
then be prosecuted.190
In an opposite result, the court held that an attempt by the gov-
ernment to assess against the defendant the costs of post-judgment,
appeal-connected hearings was improper. In United States v. Hof-
la,"' the court found that such an assessment would be an addition
to the original sentence, and further is improper as an attempt to limit
the exercise of a defendant's constitutional right to appeal.
JURY SELECTION
During jury selection, defense counsel in United States v. Book-
er192 requested that the jury be examined for any possible racial prej-
udice which might exist against the defendant, a black. The district
judge refused to question the prospective jurors on that subject. The
jury, when finally selected, contained five black and seven white ju-
rors. The court of appeals, voiding a conviction, found prejudicial
error in the failure of the district court to conduct the requested voire
dire. Booker was distinguished from Case v. United States decided in
the prior year by the Seventh Circuit193 and the court relied on recent,
analagous Supreme Court decisions in this area.,9 4  An inquiry into
racial prejudice was essential -to a fair and impartial trial of the de-
fendant's case, and its denial mandated reversal. The court found
that the inclusion of five blacks on the final panel was immaterial, and
that even one prejudiced juror can deprive defendant of a fair and im-
partial hearing. However, as this was an appeal from a federal dis-
trict court, the court of appeals held that it was not required to examine
either the actual likelihood of prejudice, or the requirement for such
a reversal under the constitution.
In United States v. Drake,'95 the defendant challenged the entire
jury array for cause. Basing his challenge primarily on the panel's
prior exposure to the prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney, the
190. 502 F.2d at 171. The court also seems to approve the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 7.05(4), with similar provisions.
191. 497 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1974).
192. 480 F.2d 1310, 1311 (7th Cir. 1973).
193. 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972), Noted in Dienes, 1973 Seventh Circuit Review,
Criminal Law and Procedure, 50 CHI-KENT L. REv. 285, 596 (1973). Chase was distin-
guished on the ground that the possibility of prejudice, where voire dire concerned court-
room security and defendant alleged exclusion of young adults from the jury, was more
remote. The Chase court felt that the omission from voire dire was relatively minor
and the evidence of guilt overwhelming. Id. at 147.
194. Aldridge v. United States, 283 US. 308 (1931); Ham v. S. Carolina, 409 U.S.
524 (1973); see also United States v. Robinson, 466 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1972) (Aldridge
not limited to black defendant, white victim).
195. 494 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1974).
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defendant also requested the right to examine the prosecutor in court
to determine the extent of his contact with the jurors. Affirming, the
court of appeals found that the district judge had not abused his dis-
cretion by denying both the challenge and the requested examination of
the prosecutor. The district court had determined that the results of
the prosecutor's two prior appearances before -those jurors were ambig-
uous, and that the impact of those cases could have been elicited on
voir dire. 196 Further, the court of appeals held that while the jurors
had been on call for a number of months, defendant had not properly
shown any violation of the statutory limitations on jury service. 1 7
Verdicts by less than twelve jurors were reviewed by the Seventh
Circuit in two cases. In United States v. Pacente, 9 s the parties stipu-
lated before trial that if "one bUt not more than two"1 99 jurors be-
came ill during trial, the proceedings could continue to verdict with an
abbreviated panel. In United States v. Baker,'00 only eleven jurors
were in the jury box after the exhaustion of all peremptory challenges
required by the rules,2"' and the parties stipulated to proceed to 'trial
with that number. In both cases, conviction was affirmed. The
defendant in Pacente argued that agreement by his counsel to an ab-
breviated jury could not bind him personally.20 2  The court of ap-
peals, apparently extending the rulings of prior cases,20 3 held how-
ever that defendant could not repudiate his counsel's stipulation but
was bound by it. Although the record showed neither a personal
waiver by defendant, nor evidence that he had conferred with counsel
prior to -the stipulation, he was evidently bound by his counsel's and
his own actions after one juror had been excused due to illness in the
family.20 4  In Baker, the defendant objected to the trial court's failure
to allow further peremptory challenges.2 0 5 In light of his failure to
196. The prosecutor had previously obtained 3 verdicts, "guilty", "non-guilty", and
"hung-jury" in the two prior cases. Id. at 649.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(e) (1968) (limit of 30 days service in two years).
198. 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc), reversing United States v. Pacente,
490 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1973) (district court reversed on other grounds).
199. Id. at 551.
200. 499 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1974).
201. FED. R. CuM. P. 24(b).
202. 503 F.2d at 551.
203. E.g. Beatty v. United States, 377 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1967) (10 jurors
within limit); Home v. United States, 264 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1959) (open court discus-
sion) cert. denied, 360 U.S. 934 (1959). The Pacente court distinguishes between re-
quirements on direct appeal and collateral attack. 503 F.2d at 552.
204. The court found family illness to be within the meaning of defendant's stipula-
tion. 503 F.2d at 552.
205. 499 F.2d at 849 (10 challenges allowed under FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b)).
CRIMINAL LAW
object at the proper time, and of his attorney's stipulation as to eleven
jurors, however, -the court of appeals found no error in the smaller
jury's verdict.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
After a trial without jury and a verdict of guilty on four counts of
an indictment, the district judge in United States v. Penick206 allotted
Criminal Justice Act 2°7 funds to allow -the defendant 'a polygraphic ex-
amination as to the first count. The trial judge stated that if 'the de-
fendant could, using the lie detector, raise a reasonable doubt 'as to the
controlled substance transaction in that count, he would be willing to
reconsider the verdict. As the court of appeals later noted carefully,
this offer was termed an "experiment. '20 8  Two months later, based
on the results of that examination, and on the ,testimony of a poly-
graph expert209 the district court reversed its findings as to that count.
The defendant immediately requested funds for the administration of
similar tests as to the remaining counts, and then appealed the denial
of that request.
Faced with the problem of lie detector tests in the federal courts,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. That decision, however, did change the
circuit's situation for these tests. Although the court of appeals rejected
the defendant's contention that the further examinations on the other
counts were required under due process constitutional rights, implicit
in its affirmation of Penick is the conclusion that polygraphic exami-
nations may indeed raise a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt.
This is an apparent extension of the lie detector's previous eviden-
tiary value. 210
The court of appeals couched its holding in the terms of prior
decisions,21' and held that 'admission of the polygraphic evidence was
a matter "within the sound discretion of district court. ' 212  While not
a wholesale acceptance, the decision here is some distance from au-
206. 496 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1974).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (1964).
208. 496 F.2d at 1109-10.
209. Cf. J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION; THE POLYGRAPH (LIE-DETEC-
TOR) TECHNIQUE, 237 et seq. (1966).
210. A similar result was reached by a state court recently in Commonwealth v. A
Juvenile (No. 1), 15 C.L.R. 2323 (Mass. 1974). Citing an extensive bibliography,
the court there found four situations permitting use of polygraph tests, all requiring
a motion by defendant and differing only as to methods for choice of examiner. As
with Penick, the Massachusetts court leaves admission to the trial judge's discretion. Id.
211. E.g., United States v. Chastain, 435 F.2d 686, 687 (7th Cir. 1970).
212. 496 F.2d at 1110.
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thority cited by the court to the effect that lie detector tests are inad-
missible as a settled rule.21  While the court notes in qualification
that the defendant in Penick appealed on the allocation of funds, and
not directly on the question of admissibility, it does hold that such allo-
cation may be justified under "special circumstances".21 4  Such a
holding would seem to require admissibility, however, in those situa-
tions.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The Seventh Circuit was also faced this year with the continuing
problem of insanity as a defense in federal criminal cases,2"5 as it af-
fects jury instructions. The court, in United States v. Greene,2"' decided
that such a defense does not require that the jury be charged with a
special instruction as to the significance of a not guilty finding, where
such a finding will result in the total freedom of the defendant.
Charged with air piracy, -the defendant in Greene asserted insan-
ity at the time of the offense as an affirmative defense. At the conclu-
sion of the case, he requested that the jury be instructed -to make a
special finding of insanity, allowing the district court to direct the Sec-
retary of Health, Education and Welfare to take custody of and com-
mit defendant until he should be cured of any mental disease. The
defendant predicated such a commitment procedure on 24 U.S.C.
§ 211.217
Affirming the district court, the majority in Greene adopted the
213. E.g., United States v. Frogge, 476 F.2d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied
414 U.S. 849 (1973) ("settled rule"); United States v. Tremont, 351 F.2d 144, 146
(1965) cert. denied, 383 U.S. 944 (1966) ("judicial distrust of such evidence"); United
States v. Salazar-Gaeta, 447 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1971).
214. 496 F.2d at 1110.
215. See, e.g., Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Ad-
ministration, 53 YALE L.J. 684 (1944); Figinski, Commitment After Acquittal On
Grounds of Insanity, 22 MD. L. REv. 293 (1962).
216. 497 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1974).
217. 24 U.S.C. §§ 211, 211(a) (1916):
If any person, charged with crime, be found, in the court before which
he is so charged, to be an insane person, such court shall certify the same to
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, who may order such person
to be confined in Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, and, if he be not indigent, he and
his estate shall be charged with expenses of his support in the hospital.
Any person becoming insane during the continuance of his sentence in the
United States penitentiary shall have the same privilege of treatment in Saint
Elizabeth's Hospital during the continuance of his mental disorder as is granted
in section 211 of this title to persons who escape the consequences of criminal
acts by reason of insanity, unless it be the opinion, both of the physician to the
penitentiary and the superintendent of the hospital, that such insane convict
is so depraved and furious in his character as to render his custody in the hos-
pital insecure, and his example pernicious.
CRIMINAL LAW
rule of all the circuits which have so far considered the question, and
ruled that 24 U.S.C. Section 211 applies only to 'the courts of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and does not provide an avenue to commitment
for the courts of any other district.218  Seeking to limit its ruling to the
application of Section 211, the court of appeals cited the legislative
history of the section,219 and noted with approval the decisions in
other circuits.220 While the court recognized the need for an instruc-
tion enabling juries to fairly weigh ,the effect of their deliberations on
a defense of insanity, it declined to act. The problem's resolution, as
stated by Judge Pell, rests with the Congress, which has been aware
of this gap in the federal system and has not acted.22'
In his well reasoned and lengthy dissent, Judge Stevens agreed
with the defendant that such a situation requires at least some special
instruction to avoid the manifest prejudice which must attach if a jury
is to assume that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is tan-
tamount to a simple finding of not guilty.2 2 While Judge Stevens does
accept the majority !analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 211, he noted that a jury
need not be confronted with the spector of endangering society by free-
ing a violent and mentally disturbed defendant. Disagreeing with the
majority contention that the federal courts must wait for congressional
action, the dissent demonstrates the power of a federal court to com-
mit a defendant under case 2 3 and statutory law,224 and under the
traditional commonlaw powers of a federal judge. Judge Stevens finds
unacceptable the government's contention that the federal courts are
impotent when faced with the dilemma of freeing or convicting the
insane defendant.225
218. Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 381 U.S.
941 (1965); White v. United States, 387 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United
States, 372 F.2d 710, 731-32 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated for resentencing 392 U.S. 651(1968), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971); United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896 (10th
Cir. 1972).
219. 11 Stat. 157-58 (1857).
220. Supra, note 218.
221. E.g., S. 979, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 2740, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). See also Note, Federal Commitment of Defendants Found Not Guilty by Rea-
son of Insanity-Proposed Legislation, 52 IOWA L. REV. 930 (1967); S. 3689, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
222. 497 F.2d at 1087 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487 (1895); Ex Parte Peterson, 253
U.S. 300, 312 (1920); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933).
224. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48 (1949).
225. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the court this year held that defendant
is not entitled to an instruction (or argument) informing the jury of a mandatory sen-
tence. United States v. Johnson, No. 74-1030 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 1974), adopting rule
in Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941
(1965). See also Chapman v. United States, 443 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1971); United
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In United States v. Bridges,226 the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded based on improper jury instructions defining reasonable
doubt. In setting forth the proper basis upon which a jury must de-
cide whether reasonable doubt exists, the given instructions had di-
rected that reasonable doubt is "not for the purpose of permitting guilty
men to escape", 227 and in a succeeding paragraph equated reasonable
doubt with a "substantial doubt based upon the evidence or lack of
evidence".22 s The offending sections are not contained in LaBuy, 229
and the Seventh Circuit joined with other circuits230 in refusing to allow
such prejudicial definitions.23'
The court of appeals also dealt with the problem of omissions
from jury instructions. Unlike the improper definition of Bridges, in
U.S. v. Knippenberg232 the court examined the lack of a proper defini-
tion of the term "wilfully", where the judge had instructed the jury that
the defendant might be found guilty if he wilfully participated in the
commission of a crime.231 And in United States v. Van Drunen, the
district judge omitted the word "not" when giving a LaBuy instruction
to the effect that "[a] defendant has the absolute right [sic] to testify,
and the jury must not draw a presumption of guilt or any inference
against the defendant because he did not testify".234
In both Knippenberg and Van Drunen ,the court of appeals held
on the basis of rule 30 that the ommissions did not constitute revers-
able error. In each case the defendant had failed to properly object
and request specific curative instructions, where the error was not an
States v. Del Toro, 426 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829
(1970).
226. 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1974).
227. Id., at 186.
228. Id.
229. LaBuy, Jury Instructions in Federal Criminal Cases, 36 F.R.D. 601 (1962).
230. Reynolds v. United States, 238 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1956) (permitting guilty
men to escape); Gomila v. United States, 146 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1944); United States
v. Atkins, 487 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1973) (substantial doubt); United States v. Alvero,
470 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1972).
231. The court also dealt with reasonable doubt in United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d
9 (7th Cir. 1974), stating as a preference that in the future this phrase would be better
understood by juries if not used in conjunction with the "troublesome" words, "sufficient
legal evidence." Id. at 23.
232. 502 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1974).
233. The Seventh Circuit also found the lack of definition for the word "wilfully"
to be free of error in United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1974). Greene,
however, involved the crime of air piracy, which the court found to be one of general
intent. 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (1958). The indictment used the word "willfully", though
the court found such surplussage immaterial. The problem of Greene's defense of di-
minished capacity should be considered together with this alleged error. Id.
234. 501 F.2d 1393, 1395 (7th Cir. 1974). LaBuy, supra note 229, instruction 6.09.
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incurable ground for mistrial.235 The court found this policy partic-
ularly apt in Van Drunen, where it found the error to be no more
than the mere slip of a trial judge's tongue.
SENTENCING
The court of appeals has been faced with several cases attempt-
ing to define the parameters of rule 32230 on sentencing procedures.
Although there are currently proposed changes to rule 32,237 recent ex-
perience still requires consideration of the cases dealing with several
sections of that rule. In United States v. Rosciano3 s the court was
faced with a defense assertion that the district judge is required by rule
32(c)(1) to order a pre-sentence report, or to give explicit reasons
for his failure to do so. The court in its original Rosciano23 9 decision,
while reiterating its preference for the use of pre-sentence reports, 240
held that despite such preference it will not constitute an abuse of dis-
cretion for a trial judge to forego the use of such a report where he de-
termines that it is unnecessary.24' Indeed, the court also reiterated
its prior holding242 -that the sentencing authority of a district court is
simply not subject to review except under extraordinary circum-
235. FED. R. C-'M. P. 30. See United States v. Zweig, 467 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th
Cir., 1972).
Rule 30 was also employed by the court this year in United States v. Joyce, 499
Fed. 2d 9, 23 (7th Cir. 1974), when it decided that LaBuy Instruction 16.02, 36 F.R.D.
601 (1962), on completion of part of a scheme or schemes as sufficient for conviction
under an indictment, was valid. While the court held under Rule 30 that the error was
waived by defendant's failure to object, the court did state that in the future this circuit
should follow the instruction and modification approved in the Eighth Circuit case of
Schaefer v. United States, 265 F.2d 750, 753 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
844 (1959), to the effect that the government must "prove one or more or a sufficient
number of the representations to indicate and show that the scheme alleged was actually
set up ...... Id. See also, Myrick v. United States, 332 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 952 (1964).
236. FED. R. ClUM. P. 32.
237. Changes to Rules 4, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 20, 29, 32 and 43 were transmitted
by the Chief Justice to Congress on April 22, 1974, with a proposed effective date of
August 1, 1974. See 94 S. Ct. (advance sheet No. 14) at 1 (May 15, 1974) (the pro-
posed change was delayed). See infra note 245.
238. 499 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1974), rehearing en banc withdrawn as improvidently
ordered, 499 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1974).
239. 497 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1974).
240. E.g., United States v. Teague, 445 F.2d 114, 122 (7th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Hutel, 416 F.2d 607, 627 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970).
241. See Farbo v. United States, 452 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1971).
242. United States v. Kaczmarek, 490 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1974), where defendant
claimed imposition of two year sentence and $10,000 fine to be penalty for standing
trial where co-defendants pleading guilty received probation. The Seventh Circuit up-
held that sentence, finding it within the statutory limit, and finding that the extraordinary
circumstances required to review trial judge's discretion were not present. Id. at 1036,
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
stances.24 8
Later sitting en banc, the court of appeals held that this was not
a proper matter for an en banc hearing.24 4  Discussing the proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court
noted that after the effective date of the new rules judges would be
required to state for the record any reasons for failure to request a pre-
sentence report.24' The court refused, however, to apply such a rule
for Rosciano. Chief Judge Swygert, Judge Stevens, and Judge Spre-
cher dissented to -the en banc denial of further deliberation.246  In his
his separate dissent, Chief Judge Swygert noted the paramount impor-
tance of fairness in sentencing procedures to the individual defend-
ant.24 7  Pointing out that future rules or parole boards cannot be ex-
pected to correct judicial errors, he stated that "[c]ourts should be
ever so sensitive to the rights and liberties of individuals. 248  Judge
Stevens also argued that sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal
process, and that a pre-sentence report is essential to a trial judge ex-
ercising broad discretion in fixing punishment. To preclude any fun-
damental unfairness, he felt that a district judge should announce and
explain why a pre-sentence report is not needed. 49
A similar problem arose in cases where a pre-sentence report had
been made to the district court, but was not then made available to
defendant. In United States v. Miller,25 the Seventh Circuit went to
great lengths to show that a decision which generally makes such re-
ports available to the defendant was not in conflict with prior decisions
in the circuit.25 1  As with the preparation of such reports in Rosci-
243. See United States v. Humphreys, 457 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1972). But, the court
remanded United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974) to the district
court for resentencing on a record which disclosed that the sentencing procedure violated
Rule 32(a)(1). The district judge had failed to ask the defendant personally if he
wished to make any statement of his own, or to present anything in mitigation of the
offense. Such an omission was, without any citation of authority by the court of ap-
peals, held to require a remand.
244. 199 F.2d 173, 174 (7th Cir. 1974).
245. The effective date for those changes was revised to August 1, 1975. P.L. 93-
361 (1974).
246. Chief Judge Swygert had previously been the only dissent in the original Ros-
ciano decision. 499 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 1974) (Swygert, C.J., dissenting).
247. Id. In his original Rosciano dissent, Chief Judge Swygert had noted the prob-
lem of disparity in sentencing, in a factual setting apparently more extreme than that
of Kaczmarek, supra, note 242.
248. 499 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1974) (Swygert, C.J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Swygert, C.J., and Sprecher, J.).
250. 495 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1974).
251. See, e.g. United States v. Humphreys, 457 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Trigg, 392 F.2d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968);
United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1967).
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ano,252 their disclosure under Miller remains in the discretion of the
trial judge, but that discretion is more closely limited by Miller. Now,
a trial judge must, if he is to consider the report in his sentencing de-
liberations,25 at least summarize to the defendant those portions which
are significant in that deliberation.254 While it leaves some room for
complete non-disclosure in exceptional cases,255 Miller dictates an aban-
donment of any policy of non-disclosure on the part of district judges.256
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The defendant in United States v. Gorden25 7 claimed that he
was being imprisoned for debt, in violation of his fifth amendment
rights. Having pleaded guilty to failure, after notice, to make deposits
of employees' withholding taxes in an account for the benefit of the
United States, defendant was sentenced to incarceration. Rejecting
the imprisonment-for-debt contention, the Seventh Circuit held that the
defendant was in fact being punished for using as his own the taxes
that he was required to hold for the Government.2 s5
In another opinion, the court held that custody in lieu of bond
while awaiting -trial is not punishment at all, and therefore cannot be
of a cruel and unusual nature. In Potter v. Clark,259 the defendant
had been placed in isolation for damaging jail cameras. Such actions
are not punishment, the court held, and are merely administrative ac-
tions taken to preserve the security of the jail.
252. Supra note 238.
253. In United States v. Haygood, 502 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1974), the court also
agreed that a trial court may consider "sentencing charges based on the same transaction
as that before the court. See the discussion under double jeopardy, supra, note 188 and
accompanying text. The Haygood court also discussed the attachment of "minimal sig-
nificance" to such facts by the trial judge. 502 F.2d at 169.
254. The court extends its ruling on pre-sentence report to reports by prosecutors,
which it feels may require greater safeguards due to the prosecutor's adversary role, 495
F.2d at 366. See United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1119, cert. denied, 399 U.S.
911 (1970).
255. The court leaves to trial courts' discretion the problem arising where disclo-
sure would of necessity reveal the source of information contained in the report. 495
F.2d at 365.
256. Five days after the Miller decision, it was interpreted in United States v. Gor-
den, 495 F.2d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1974) where the court held that the district court's
disclosure in summary of, "trust fund tax delinquencies and his marital infidelity", as
its basis in the report for sentencing was proper. Id. at 310.
257. 495 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1974).
258. Citing United States v. Patterson, 465 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1038 (1973).
259. No. 73-2135 (7th Cir., May 16, 1974) (per curiam). Nor do due process
hearings requirements apply in this situation. Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
HABEAS CORPUS
In Hayes v. Cady,260 the court of appeals held that where a mur-
der suspect denied a possessory interest in the premises to be searched
without a warrant, police were justified in seeking out permission from
anyone legally or logically able to furnish the requisite consent. The
defendant's disclaimer acted as a reversion to the landlady,2" 1 who
properly admitted the officer. The evidence was not obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. More importantly, 'the Hayes court
also rejected the defendant's contention that he had been improperly
advised under Miranda when officers did not tell him of his right to
appointed counsel if he was indigent, prior to his interrogation. The
court was aware of the fact that Wisconsin law made no provision for
the 'appointment of free counsel in this situation,26 2 and the authori-
ties could not have complied with that aspect of the Miranda warnings.
The defendant in Hayes, 'the court held, was not prejudiced by this
failure of the Miranda warnings.2 63
In United States ex. rel. Saiken v. Bensinger,264 another murder
case, a state prisoner contended that his fourth amendment rights were
violated in state court when his motion to quash a search warrant and
suppress -the evidence recovered thereunder was improperly denied.
The petitioner claimed that the warrant failed to sufficiently describe
the underlying circumstances necessary to show that the informant was
credible. The affidavit did not show how the informant knew that the
body of a murder victim would be found at the location described in
the warrant. The court, applying the two-pronged test announced in
Aguilar v. Texas,265 found the affidavit insufficient as a matter of
law, and remanded to the state court for further proceedings. Judge
Sprecher concurred in the decision to return the case to the state court,
but argued that this is the first instance where the body of a murder
victim is to be suppressed by the imposition of the exclusionary
rule. 2 66
260. 500 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974). See discussion of this case under consensual
searches, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
261. Id. at 1214.
262. Id.
263. See Michigan v. Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974). See discussion of Miranda re-
quirements, supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
264. 489 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1974).
265. 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
266. 489 F.2d at 899 (Sprecher, J., concurring). Judge Sprecher points to this ac-
tion as the fulfillment of many jurists' worst nightmares on the subject of the exclusion-
ary rule. His research and comments are most interesting. Id,
